Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) Payments 2016-2021
Keywords
Covert, Human, Intelligence, Source, Payments, Informants, Spent, Data, Protests, Environmental, Black, Lives, Matter, Breakdown, Year.
Publication Number
PUB 1299
FOI Reference Number
16339
Request Title
Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) Payments
Date Range
2016-2021
Information Requested
This is a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act. I would like to request the following information:
(1) For the calendar years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and available data for 2021, please state how much the police force has spent on informants. Please provide a breakdown by year.
(2) For the calendar years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and available data for 2021, please state how much the police force has spent on informants in relation to Black Lives Matter. Please provide a breakdown by year.
(3) For the calendar years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and available data for 2021, please state how much the police force has spent on informants in relation to environmental groups and environmental protests. Please provide a breakdown by year.
Disclosure with Exemptions
Part disclosure with Section 23(5), Section 24(2), Section 30(3), Section 31(3), Section 38(2), Section 40(5) exemptions.
Information Correct as at
01 November 2021
Date of Disclosure
25 November 2021
Related Documents/Links
FOI 16339 Response
In relation to Question 1, having completed enquiries within Essex Police in respect of Section 1(1)(a), Essex Police does hold information relating to your request, Essex Police can confirm in respect of Section 1(1)(b) the following data:
In line with previous similar requests, Essex Police has a duty to provide as much information as possible. We can confirm the following median average spend on informants:
The median for the financial years 2015/16 to 2020/21 is £84,840.
This approach serves the public interest whilst ensuring no investigation is prejudiced and no individual comes to harm.
No further information will be disclosed by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) Information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies
Section 24(2) National Security
Evidence of Harm
As you will be aware, disclosure under the FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may use CHIS, would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
Public Interest Considerations
Section 24(2) National Security
Factors favouring complying with Section (1)(1)(a) confirming that information is held
The public are entitled to know how funds are spent and resources distributed within an area of policing, particularly with regards to how the Police investigate crimes which could directly affect National Security including terrorism. To confirm whether information exists would enable the general public to hold Essex Police to account in relation to how all CHIS are recruited by Essex Police to ensure it is done so in line with Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) legislation and local force policies and procedures.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held
Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, there should be no confirmation or denial that information is or is not held where confirmation or denial may aid a terrorist and their activities. To what extent confirmation or denial may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.
The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain and in some circumstances such as these, confirmation or denial that information may be held.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of vulnerabilities within certain scenarios. The more information placed in the public domain over time, even by confirming or denying, will provide a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole.
Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.
Balance Test
The points above highlight the merits of confirming, or denying, whether any information pertinent to this request exists. The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As part of that policing purpose, various tactical options, including the use of CHIS, may or may not be utilised. The Police Service will never divulge whether or not information pertinent to this request does or does not exist, if to do so would place the safety of any individual at risk, compromise an ongoing investigation or undermine the policing purpose in the effective delivery of operational law enforcement.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and investigations, providing reassurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of Police investigations and all areas of operations carried out by Police forces throughout the UK.
As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced it will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test for neither confirming, nor denying that information is held is appropriate.
No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.
In relation to Questions 2 and 3, Essex Police can neither confirm nor deny that information is held relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the FOIA does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) Information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies
Section 24(2) National Security
Section 30(3) Investigations by virtue of Section 30(2)
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Section 38(2) Health and Safety
Section 40(5) Personal Information
Evidence of Harm
Any release under the FOIA is a disclosure to the world, not just to the individual making the request. To confirm or not that information is held pertinent to this request would reveal whether or not Essex Police has received intelligence on a specific subject area from CHIS as well as confirming whether or not these CHIS have received monetary gain for their intelligence.
Police forces work in conjunction with other agencies and information is freely shared in line with information sharing protocols. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regards to both law enforcement and National Security. The public expect Police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. In this case the use of CHIS with regards to Extinction Rebellion and Black Lives Matter.
The prevention and detection of crime is the foundation upon which policing is built and the threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The current UK threat level from international terrorism, based on intelligence, is assessed as substantial which means that a terrorist attack is likely.
In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour, it is vital that the Police have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to assist in the investigative process to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of offenders who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism.
To achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place between Police Officers, members of the public, Police forces as well as other law enforcement bodies within the United Kingdom. Such action would support counter‑terrorism measures in the fight to deprive terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime.
The impact of providing information under FOI which aids in identifying whether or not Essex Police has received intelligence from CHIS relating to Extinction Rebellion and Black Lives Matter, as well as confirming whether payment was received for the intelligence, would provide those intent on committing criminal or terrorists acts with valuable information as to where the police are targeting their investigations.
In addition, to confirm or deny whether information is held in this case has the potential to undermine the flow of information (intelligence) received from CHIS as well as members of the public into the Police Service relating to these types of offenders thereby undermining National Security and leaving the United Kingdom at risk of more terrorist attack.
Public Interest Considerations
Section 24(2) National Security
Factors favouring complying with Section (1)(1)(a) confirming that information is held
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and resources distributed within an area of policing, particularly with regards to how the Police investigate terrorist offending. To confirm whether or not information exists would enable the general public to hold Essex Police to account in relation to how they gather intelligence within areas of policing.
Furthermore, confirming or denying may improve public debate and assist the community to take steps to protect themselves.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held
Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.
The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regards to their safety and protection. The only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.
The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of vulnerabilities within certain scenarios, as in this case which forces have received intelligence from CHIS’ relating to this subject area. The more information disclosed over time will provide a more detailed account of the intelligence received into the force relating to these types of protests.
Section 30(3) Investigations
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming information is held
Confirming or denying whether information exists relevant to this request would lead to a better informed general public by identifying that Essex Police robustly gather intelligence received into their force from confidential sources, relating to protests. This fact alone may encourage individuals to provide intelligence in order to assist with investigations and would also promote public trust in providing transparency and demonstrating openness and accountability into where the police are currently focusing their investigations.
The public are also entitled to know how public funds are spent.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held
Modern-day policing is intelligence led. To confirm or not whether Essex Police has received intelligence from a confidential source (CHIS) relating to Extinction Rebellion/Black Lives Matter could hinder the prevention and detection of crime and undermine any ongoing investigations, by restricting the flow of information into the force.
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming information is held
The fact that the Police Service use CHIS to assist in the delivery of effective operational law enforcement is published and that in itself favours disclosure.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held
Essex Police has a duty of care to the community at large and public safety is of paramount importance. If an FOI disclosure revealed information to the world (by citing an exemption or stating no information held) that would assist an offender, such an action would undermine the security of the national infrastructure, by revealing our ‘intelligence’ thereby highlighting vulnerabilities force by force.
By its very nature, by confirming or denying this information is held would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. Under FOI there is a requirement to comply with Section 1(1)(a) and confirm what information is held. In some cases, it is that confirmation, or not, which could disclose facts harmful to members of the public, Police Officers, other law enforcement agencies and their employees.
Section 38 Health and Safety
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming information is held
Confirming whether information is or is not held would provide reassurance to the general public that Essex Police use tactical options with regard to the use of CHIS as a means of acquiring intelligence. This awareness could be used to improve any public consultations; debates in relation to this subject and also allow the public to take steps to protect themselves.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that information is held
Confirming or denying that information exists could lead to the loss of public confidence in Essex Police’s ability to protect the wellbeing of individuals recruited as CHIS’ as well as members of the community at large.
Essex Police has a duty of care towards any individual who has been recruited as a CHIS. To reveal information via an FOI request which would place the safety of individuals in grave danger, is not in the public interest.
Balance Test
The points above highlight the merits of confirming, or denying, whether information pertinent to this request exists. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As part of that policing purpose, various operations with other law enforcement bodies may or may not be ongoing. The Police Service will never divulge whether or not information is held if to do so would place the safety of individual(s) at risk or undermine National Security.
Whilst there is a public interest in appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding National Security. As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regards to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with any information that is released. Confirming or denying whether information is or is not held would definitely reveal policing activity and would assist those intent on causing harm. Any incident that results from confirmation or denial would, by default, affect National Security.
Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test for confirming, nor denying, that information is held with regards to questions 2 and 3 is made out.
No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.