Time Held in Custody 2019 to 2020
Keywords
Calendar, Year, Booked, Custody, Suite, Arrest, Monthly, Breakdown, Age, Sex, Gender, Ethnicity, Detainee, Detained, Detention, Crime, Power, Time, Minutes, Arrival, Leaving, Designated, Facility, Closure, Outcome, Bail, RUI, Charged
Publication Number
PUB 1252
FOI Reference Number
15778
Request Title
Time Held in Custody
Date Range
2019 to 2020
Information Requested
For the calendar years of 2019 and 2020, I would like you to provide me with the number of people booked into the force’s custody suites following an arrest, broken down by month.
I would like you to provide me with the age, sex and ethnicity of each detainee as well as the crime or power under which they were detained.
For each detainee, I would like you to provide me with the time of arrival at the designated custody facility and the time of their custody record’s closure, regardless of whether the outcome was bail, RUI, a charge or any other outcome. I am seeking only the time arriving in and leaving custody detention so please do not include days on bail etc.
For each detainee, please provide the total number of time spent in police custody in minutes.
Disclosure with Exemptions
Part Disclosure with Section 40(2), Section 44(1), Section 24(1) and Section 31(1) Exemptions
Information Correct as at
29 June 2021
Date of Disclosure
15 September 2021
Related Documents/Links
N/A
FOI 15778 Response
Having completed enquiries within Essex Police in respect of Section 1(1)(a), Essex Police does hold information relating to your request, Essex Police can confirm in respect of Section 1(1)(b) the following data:
Caveats:
The data is correct as at 29 June 2021.
The data contains all main arrests for 2019 and 2020.
Date of Birth, Gender and Ethnicity may not always be recorded.
For the calendar years of 2019 and 2020, I would like you to provide me with the number of people booked into the force’s custody suites following an arrest, broken down by month.
Number of Arrests for 2019 and 2020
|
Year |
Month |
Number of Arrests |
|---|---|---|
|
2019 |
Jan |
2193 |
|
Feb |
1933 |
|
|
Mar |
2236 |
|
|
Apr |
2112 |
|
|
May |
2095 |
|
|
Jun |
2147 |
|
|
Jul |
2250 |
|
|
Aug |
2140 |
|
|
Sep |
1977 |
|
|
Oct |
2092 |
|
|
Nov |
2124 |
|
|
Dec |
2001 |
|
|
Total |
25300 |
|
|
2020 |
Jan |
2086 |
|
Feb |
1989 |
|
|
Mar |
2092 |
|
|
Apr |
2182 |
|
|
May |
2668 |
|
|
Jun |
2475 |
|
|
Jul |
2615 |
|
|
Aug |
2415 |
|
|
Sep |
2262 |
|
|
Oct |
2258 |
|
|
Nov |
2216 |
|
|
Dec |
1924 |
|
|
Total |
27182 |
|
|
Grand Total |
52482 |
|
I would like you to provide me with the age, sex and ethnicity of each detainee as well as the crime or power under which they were detained.
Detainee Age Information
|
Age Group |
Count of Age Group |
|---|---|
|
Under 18 |
3465 |
|
18-29 |
19047 |
|
30-39 |
15072 |
|
40-49 |
9163 |
|
50-59 |
4368 |
|
60-69 |
1061 |
|
70+ |
300 |
|
Not Recorded |
6 |
|
Total |
52482 |
Detainee Gender Information
|
Gender |
Count of Gender |
|---|---|
|
Female |
7898 |
|
Male |
44547 |
|
Not Recorded |
19 |
|
Unknown |
4 |
|
Unspecified |
14 |
|
Total |
52482 |
Detainee Ethnicity Information
|
Ethnicity Self |
Count of Ethnicity Self |
|---|---|
|
African |
1565 |
|
Any Other Asian Background |
559 |
|
Any Other Black Background |
1097 |
|
Any Other Ethnic Group |
527 |
|
Any Other Mixed Background |
584 |
|
Any Other White Background |
3665 |
|
Arab |
7 |
|
Bangladeshi |
333 |
|
Caribbean |
719 |
|
Chinese |
91 |
|
Gypsy or Irish Traveller |
9 |
|
Indian |
267 |
|
Not stated |
6621 |
|
Pakistani |
269 |
|
White And Asian |
186 |
|
White And Black African |
305 |
|
White And Black Caribbean |
880 |
|
White British |
34235 |
|
White Irish |
563 |
|
Total |
52482 |
Type of Offence Information
|
Offence Type |
Count of Offence Type |
|---|---|
|
Drug Offences |
4105 |
|
Fraud and Kindred Offences |
383 |
|
Miscellaneous |
9511 |
|
Not Recorded |
546 |
|
Offences Against Property |
2908 |
|
Offences Against the Person |
14777 |
|
Offences Relating to Immigration |
831 |
|
Police/Courts/Prison offences |
6372 |
|
Public Disorder Offences |
2066 |
|
Sexual Offences |
2110 |
|
Theft and Kindred Offences |
7325 |
|
Weapon / Firearm Offences |
1548 |
|
Total |
52482 |
For each detainee, I would like you to provide me with the time of arrival at the designated custody facility and the time of their custody record’s closure, regardless of whether the outcome was bail, RUI, a charge or any other outcome. I am seeking only the time arriving in and leaving custody detention so please do not include days on bail etc. For each detainee, please provide the total number of time spent in police custody in minutes.
Custody Times are not always accurate as dates may have been entered inaccurately or may have been recorded within the Custody Log which is not in an extractable format. Some records are not closed correctly due to system downtime and other issues which can result in some exceptionally long and erroneous time periods being recorded. Due to these issues, we see little point in providing inaccurate data, however, if you do still require this information, then please let us know. The Custody system is designed primarily for the management of individual cases and not primarily for the production of statistical information for FOI responses.
Essex Police will not provide any further breakdown or information as the exemptions under FOI Section 40(2) Personal Information and Section 44(1) information covered by Prohibitions on disclosure such as the Sexual Offences (amendment) act 1992 which provides anonymity to victims of sexual offences.
No further information will be provided by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)– Law Enforcement
Overall Harm
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’, see below link:
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
In order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the Police and other agencies have the ability to work together, where necessary overtly and covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to ensure the successful arrest and prosecution of those who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism and other criminality. In order to achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place with other Police forces and security bodies within the UK and Internationally in order to support counter-terrorism measures in the fight to deprive international terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and Essex Police will not divulge any further information if to do so would undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by a terrorist attack, or disruption due to extremism, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of Police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive areas of which they work.
Modern-day policing is intelligence led and intelligence changes on a day-by-day basis.
To provide any further information would undermine individual forces policing capabilities which consequently would be detrimental to their ability to deal with the on-going terrorist threat we face. By providing the number of terrorism arrests by an individual force would allow comparison between forces across the country and enable terrorists to build a picture of what resources are in place and where they are deployed. It is felt that to provide further information would prejudice the effectiveness of the national counter terrorism effort and would allow inferences to be drawn about force level counter-terrorism activity and identify vulnerability around the country.
Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 24
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by disclosing this information the public would be able to see where public money is being spent and know that forces are doing as much as they can to combat terrorism and radicalisation. Revealing this information would enable the public to have some reassurance that the Governments Counter Terrorism Strategy is robust. This is an issue high on the public agenda and, therefore, the release of this information would contribute to an informed public debate.
Factors against disclosure of information for Section 24
Revealing detailed statistics may increase interest in cases which could ultimately lead to the identity of individuals and the organisations we work with, which may assist others intending to counter such work. Identification of those working locally to deliver the aims and objectives could enable those wishing to counter such work to engage in activity to disrupt and jeopardise the successful delivery of ongoing work. This could threaten the successful delivery of the Government's Counter Terrorism Strategy and lead to the public being at increased risk from terrorism. There is also a potential for such data to be used to increase community tensions in an area which would not be in the public interest
Any information shared between agencies (intelligence) has the potential to cover all aspects of criminal activity, be it threats to National Security, future planned robberies or intelligence relating to terrorist activity. Disclosure of the information would enable those intent on engaging in terrorist activities to determine on a National level which areas within the UK may be a vulnerable area to target.
Factors favouring disclosure of information for Section 31
There may be a public interest in the release of this information because it may reassure the public that there are effective processes in place to ensure that people showing signs or indicators that they are intent to use violence or other illegal means are monitored effectively and assessed for the presence of vulnerability. Disclosure of the information would provide reassurance to the public that the Police have in place protocols to deal with these types of incidents and offences.
Factors against disclosure of information for Section 31
Disclosure of the information would mean that Law Enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed because criminals would know which forces are focusing on this programme. A fear of crime would be realised because if the terrorists identified more vulnerable areas, they would target and exploit these areas and the public would be in fear of more criminal/terrorist activity occurring. There would be an impact on Police resources because if the measure used by forces to detect terrorist activities is disclosed and some areas are deemed to be 'softer' at managing this threat, terrorist cells may move to these areas in order to continue their operations and target vulnerable individuals.
Balance Test
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine National Security or compromise Law Enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations, information gathering and in this case providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively safeguarding those who are vulnerable to radicalisation and targeting the cells behind the radicalisation, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of Police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive area of terrorism.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Whilst there is a strong public interest in the transparency of policing programmes and in this case, providing assurance that the Police Service and other stakeholders are appropriately and effectively engaging with one another, combating the threat posed by individuals with the intent to use violence and other illegal means, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of the stakeholders within the programme.
Essex Police will not divulge information if it is likely that it will compromise the work of the Police Service or place members of the public at risk. It is known that terrorist cells will try to radicalise people and children so that they believe in their ideology in order to encourage them to commit acts of terror. Disclosure of the requested information would highlight which forces may have individuals who are more susceptible to radicalisation and how each force tackles this within their communities. This will adversely affect Essex Police ability to detect this type of crime as it may alter the behaviours of those preying on vulnerable individuals. This in itself could put the individual's life at risk along with that of National Security. It is, therefore, our belief that the balance test lies in favour of not disclosing the information.
Every effort is made to ensure that the data provided by Essex Police is accurate and complete. However, Essex Police systems are designed primarily for the management of individual cases and not for the purposes of providing data to answer specific FOI enquiries. Please note although data can be extracted from a number of sources via database queries, the results may be subject to inaccuracies. Care should be taken to understand our return when considering the interpretation or further use of the data.
The Force Information Management Board chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable has oversight of the Force wide programme of work to improve the quality of Force data. This work has identified data quality leads in all key areas of the business including the Crime and Public Protection Command. Liaison between the Force Data Quality Team and the Crime and Public Protection Command lead for data quality will identify and resolve issues through a variety of mechanisms to ensure regular and appropriate supervisory oversight.