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Number: D 2701
Last Updated: 5 November 2024
Version 1 – November 2024
This is a new procedure
2.1 This procedure explains the standard procedures to be adopted when planning for, using, and reviewing the use of Live Facial Recognition.
2.2 This LFR Procedure document provides Essex Police personnel with advice on the overt use of LFR in a legally complaint and ethical manner to enable Essex Police to achieve legitimate policing aims.
2.3 This procedure document has been written with consideration to the views of the Information Commissioner, Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, national guidance and a code of practice relating to LFR and its use by UK Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA).
2.4This procedure is particularly aimed at (this list is non-exhaustive):
Compliance with this procedure and any governing policy is mandatory.
This procedure focuses exclusively on LFR. Terminology relating to LFR is defined in the Essex Police LFR Policy Document.
This procedure aims to:
This document has been drafted to comply with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998. It pays particular attention to the duties of the force regarding privacy and the rights to assembly, thought and expression.
Equality and Diversity duties and issues have been considered and this is reflected in the Equality and Wellbeing Impact Assessment that is provided alongside this document.
As with all policies, the duties, and obligations of the force regarding Data Protection, Freedom of Information and Health and Safety matters have been considered and complied with along with The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on Facial Recognition Technology.
LFR deployments must comply with the following strategic objectives:
3.5.1 There are nine stages of deployment which consist of the following:
3.5.2 In normal circumstances the authorising officer who authorises a LFR deployment should not be below the rank of Superintendent. It is preferred but not necessary for this Superintendent to be an accredited Authorising Officer. This authorisation should be in writing.
3.5.3 The EP LFR Application / Written Authority Document recognises that the intelligence case for the use of LFR may give rise to a single deployment, or a need for a series of deployments within a time-limited period.
3.5.4 In Essex Police an Authorising Officer may authorise the use of LFR based on one application for a period of up to 7 days.
3.5.5 The application combined with the authorising document provides for a baseline of safeguards to ensure that the need for the deployment and the currency of the watchlist continues to be maintained with due oversight.
3.5.6 Should the need to deploy continue beyond 7 days, a further EP LFR Application will be submitted, and a further authority would be granted if, in the AOs view the conditions for deployment continue to be met.
3.5.7 This approach ensures that the use of LFR is time limited but allows an operationally effective way to plan for and deliver LFR as part of wider EP crime-fighting strategies.
3.5.8 Prior to the authorisation of LFR by an AO several documents must be completed and an Essex Police officer of NPCC rank must be engaged by the AO.
3.5.9 The Chief Officer does not provide authority for LFR deployment, consultation at this level exist to expose the proposed deployment to an elevated level of strategic thinking, where Pan-Essex issues are accounted for.
This also affords the Chief Officer the opportunity to veto the deployment or ask the AO to consider what mitigation is required to address concerns at hand.
3.5.10 Where the AO is not immediately able to provide their authority in writing and the request is urgent, such authority may be given verbally. The time of this verbal authority must be recorded by the applicant and the AO. Written authority must then be recorded as soon as it practicable.
3.5.11 Urgent deployments are defined as those in which that a delay of deployment in order to complete a written application and authority documents would place people or property at serious risk of harm or be a risk to national security; or
3.5.12 An intelligence or investigative opportunity with limited time to act, the seriousness of which and the benefit of deployment justifies urgent action.
3.5.13 The AO must consider document the below:
3.5.14 The AO should must be satisfied that there is a ‘pressing social need’ for the deployment and it is not reasonably viable to address this through less intrusive means, either because less intrusive methods have tried and failed or because there are reasonable grounds to believe that such tactics are unlikely to be effective and
3.5.15 Necessary on at least one of the following grounds:
3.5.16 Articulate that the AO considers the benefits of the deployment are proportionate to the impact on the public’s human rights and rights relating to equality.
3.5.17 Articulate that the AO is satisfied that the control measures in the data protection impact assessment, community impact assessment and equality impact assessment have been reviewed and that the AO considers them to the appropriate mitigants for the deployment.
3.5.18 Articulate what the AO’s minimum threshold setting to be utilised during the deployment. Ordinarily this setting will be equal to or above the value where no FRT System bias is detected. The Threshold value may be lowered based on the intelligence case with a full rationale detailed in the EP LFR Application / Written Authority Document.
3.5.19 In cases where there is an urgent need to deploy LFR and an Authorising Officer not below the rank of Superintendent is not available then an Officer not below the rank of Inspector may authorise the deployment provided they are satisfied the request is urgent.
3.5.20 The officer not below the rank of Inspector authorising the deployment must inform an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of the authority as soon as practicable.
3.5.21 The Superintendent is then to authorise the continued deployment, make changes to the authority as they deem necessary or order its immediate cessation.
3.5.22 Should a further law enforcement purpose be identified after the AO has issued their authority for an LFR Deployment, processing in respect of the law enforcement purpose is not permissible unless the AO grants a further authority for it. Such authority would consider the lawfulness, strict necessity, and proportionality of using LFR to meet the law enforcement purpose and its compatibility with the original law enforcement purpose.
3.6.1 The AO should define the date, time, location, and duration the Deployment is authorised for based on the principles of necessity and proportionality in pursuing a legitimate policing aim, informed by the intelligence case behind the Deployment.
3.6.2 The applicant and AO will consider the following when determining the date, time, location, and duration: The intelligence case, policing purpose to include a person on a Watchlist, Community Impact Assessment and the environmental factors relevant to a potential Deployment.
3.6.3 Deployment locations will be determined by there being reasonable grounds to suspect that the proposed Deployment location is one at which one or more persons on the Watchlist will attend at a time or times at which they are to be sought by means of LFR. The reasons for any selected Deployment location should be recorded and be capable of being considered and evaluated by an objective third person.
3.6.4 The selection of a particular Deployment location may further be supported by:
3.7 When reviewing a potential Deployment location, AOs must also consider those who are likely to pass the LFR System and:
3.8 If a proposed Deployment location attracts particular concerns by reference to those expected to be at a particular location:
3.9 Where it is practicable to identify a person of being responsible for a proposed Deployment location, and that location raises a greater expectation of privacy, consideration should be given to liaising with that person as part of a community impact assessment process. Legal advice should be sought where appropriate.
3.10 Where privacy or other human rights considerations are identified in relation to a particular Deployment, the AO needs to consider the necessity to Deploy LFR to that particular location and whether the aims being pursued could be similarly achieved elsewhere. In instances where that location is necessary (with the processing of data at that site being strictly necessary), AOs then need to identify any mitigations that are viable in the circumstances and then weigh the rights of those engaged by the LFR System against the likely benefits of using LFR. This is to ensure the policing action proposed is not disproportionate to the aim being pursued.
3.11 The public should be notified of LFR Deployments in advance using force websites and other appropriate communication channels (including social media).
3.12 Measures should also be taken during the Deployment to ensure the policing presence is overt such that the public can establish that LFR is being used and understand the nature of the data being processed. In addition to the use of uniformed officers and marked vehicle(s), other steps for applicants to consider in the context of their proposed deployment location include the use of signage placed in advance (outside) of the Zone of Recognition and/or the provision of information leaflets. In considering the level of awareness raising measures, whilst a baseline needs to be maintained to ensure that any deployment is overt, the objectives for the deployment and its use a policing tactic will also be relevant if the policing need to deploy is to be realised. For example, unduly extensive signage may undermine the effectiveness of a deployment seeking to locate persistently outstanding offenders. By comparison a deployment seeking to protect a site or particular event may merit multiple levels of signs and the proactive distribution of leaflets to deter those with mal-intent.
3.13 If a person decides not to walk through the Zone of Recognition this action does not in itself justify the use of a policing power. EP staff deployed to this operation must be accountable for their own actions and must exercise their powers in accordance with the law and the Code of Ethics.
3.14 Any member of the public who is Engaged as part of an LFR Deployment should, in the normal course of events, also be offered an information leaflet about the technology. Any person who requires further information relating to LFR should be provided with contact information for the EP LFR operational team by e-mail to [email protected].
3.15.1 This section covers the composition, generation and management of Watchlists to be used in LFR Deployments and is structured to address:
3.15.2 The criteria for the construction of the Watchlist for use with LFR must be approved by the AO, fall within the criteria stipulated in this EP LFR SOP and be specific to an operation or to a defined policing objective.
Watchlists, and the images for inclusion on a Watchlist must comply with the following requirements:
Watchlists must be driven by a policing need and based on the intelligence case
The intelligence case must be current and reviewed before each Deployment.
Rationale for the requirement:
This intelligence-driven approach ensures that the make-up of the Watchlist is reflective of, and for the purpose of the LFR Deployment
Watchlists must only contain images lawfully held by police with consideration also being given as to:
Rationale for the requirement:
This requirement ensures that all images proposed for inclusion are lawfully held by the police – this includes consideration of the legal basis, human rights (including intrusion) and data protection considerations. This ensures that in all cases, the lawfulness and intrusion caused by using the image is considered and justified. It also ensures that where the legal basis limits how the police hold and process an image (for example for what purposes it may be used), this is considered to ensure legal compliance.
Additionally policing has a responsibility to avoid compromising policing tactics or exposing sources to risk – this requirement covers this point.
Watchlists must only use images where all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that the image:
Regard must be paid to the prospect of the LFR System generating an Alert should an older image be proposed for inclusion where the person’s facial features may have changed or aged significantly since the image was taken.
Regard must also be paid to the ability of the LFR System to operate within the 1:1000 False Alert Rate using the proposed image and if there is a need to adjust a Threshold in relation to the proposed image (at the outset or as part of the ongoing responsibilities of the LFR Operator);
Rationale for the requirement:
This requirement is to ensure that the act of placing a person on a Watchlist is best aligned with locating that person should they pass the LFR System.
This requirement and the prescribed False Alert Rate is also designed to minimise the likelihood of unduly inconveniencing others not of interest to policing whilst ensuring those sought are located.
The EP SRO for LFR has determined the 1:1000 False Alert Rate represents an approach which balances these factors in a proportionate way.
Watchlists must not be imported into the LFR System more than 24 hours prior to the start of the Deployment.
Rationale for the requirement:
This is to ensure the ongoing currency of a Watchlist should a Deployment be necessarily undertaken for a period of longer than 24 hours
Watchlists should benefit from technical measures being adopted through the segregation within the Watchlist.
Rationale for the requirement:
This is to ensure the status of those on a Watchlist is recognised by those involved in undertaking Engagements in order to ensure the appropriate action is taken should an Alert be generated
3.16 In December 2020 the Surveillance Camera Commissioner (SCC) published his best practice guidance document ‘Facing the Camera’. The SCC advocated the need to ensure suitable controls exist around the placing of persons with protected characteristics on a Watchlist. Any controls, mitigations and processes identified by EP in this document reflect the EP LFR System’s performance and EP’s particular use-cases for LFR.
3.17 EP has confidence in the LFR System’s performance, particularly in relation to gender, age and race.
3.18 EP has confidence in the LFR System’s performance, particularly in relation to gender, age and race.
3.19 EP recognises that regardless of performance considerations, it should take particular care when considering and publishing details relating to (i) age including the protection of children – particularly the very young, (ii) the disabled and (iii) those who have and/or are undertaking a gender reassignment. This is because:
3.20 Documenting composition: EP provides that each Deployment must specifically identify and document whether the Watchlist contains persons who are believed or suspected to be:
3.21 The following outlines further, specific safeguards that apply to the composition of the watchlist:
Circumstances
LFR is used to locate a person under 18 and that person’s records state that person is aged (or suspected to be aged) under 18-years-old
Safeguards
Necessity
Specific regard needs to be had for the importance of locating the subject on a risk-based approach in line with EP LFR Documents with a particular focus on ensuring the necessity case is fully made out.
Technical Advice
Regard should also be had to consider System and Subject Factors and the ability for the LFR System to generate an accurate Alert against the image proposed for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Consideration should be given to the likely crowd flow / occlusion risk where shorter subjects may otherwise be blocked from the camera’s line of sight.
Circumstances
LFR is used to locate a person under 18 and that person’s records state that person is aged (or suspected to be aged) under 13-years-old[7]
Safeguards
Necessity
Specific regard needs to be had for the importance of locating the subject on a risk-based approach in line with EP LFR Documents with a particular focus on ensuring the necessity case is fully made out.
Watchlist Images
There is a particular need to ensure that the image is a current as possible and of a suitable quality for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Legal Advice
Specific advice must be sought from Legal Services and the EP LFR team prior to any seeking authorisation from an AO. Where authorisation is then sought, this advice needs to be provided to the AO to help inform their decision making and allow the AO to record their decision regarding any inclusion on the Watchlist and outline further safeguards that should apply.
Technical Advice
Regard should also be had to consider System and Subject Factors and the ability for the LFR System to generate an accurate Alert against the image proposed for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Technical advice should be sought on a case-by-case basis to inform this assessment.
Where authorisation is then sought, this advice needs to be provided to the AO to help inform their decision making and allow the AO to record their decision regarding any inclusion on the Watchlist and outline further safeguards that should apply.
Circumstances
LFR is to be used to locate a person and that person’s records state that person has (or is suspected to have) a relevant disability
Safeguards
Necessity
Specific regard needs to be had for the importance of locating the subject on a risk-based approach in line with EP LFR Documents with a particular focus on ensuring the necessity case is fully made out.
Watchlist Images
There is a particular need to ensure that the image is a current as possible and of a suitable quality for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Legal Advice
Specific advice must be sought from Legal Services and the EP LFR team prior to any seeking authorisation from an AO. Where authorisation is then sought, this advice needs to be provided to the AO to help inform their decision making and allow the AO to record their decision regarding any inclusion on the Watchlist and outline further safeguards that should apply.
Technical Advice
Regard should also be had to consider System and Subject Factors and the ability for the LFR System to generate an accurate Alert against the image proposed for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Technical advice should be sought on a case-by-case basis to inform this assessment.
Where authorisation is then sought, this advice needs to be provided to the AO to help inform their decision making and allow the AO to record their decision regarding any inclusion on the Watchlist and outline further safeguards that should apply.
Circumstances
LFR is to be used to locate a person and that person’s records state that person has (or is suspected to have) (i) undertaken a gender reassignment and (ii) it is believed or suspected to be that the Watchlist would be using an image of that person taken prior to their reassignment
Safeguards
Necessity
Specific regard needs to be had for the importance of locating the subject on a risk-based approach in line with EP LFR Documents with a particular focus on ensuring the necessity case is fully made out.
Watchlist Images
There is a particular need to ensure that the image is a current as possible and of a suitable quality for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Legal Advice
Specific advice must be sought from Legal Services and the EP LFR team prior to any seeking authorisation from an AO. Where authorisation is then sought, this advice needs to be provided to the AO to help inform their decision making and allow the AO to record their decision regarding any inclusion on the Watchlist and outline further safeguards that should apply.
Technical Advice
Regard should also be had to consider System and Subject Factors and the ability for the LFR System to generate an accurate Alert against the image proposed for inclusion on the Watchlist.
Technical advice should be sought on a case-by-case basis to inform this assessment.
Where authorisation is then sought, this advice needs to be provided to the AO to help inform their decision making and allow the AO to record their decision regarding any inclusion on the Watchlist and outline further safeguards that should apply.
3.22 Images that may be deemed appropriate for inclusion within an LFR watchlist include custody images of individuals and / or police originated images other than custody images of people who are:
3.23 A decision to include a ‘High and or Medium Risk’ missing person on a watchlist should be made on a case-by-case basis with regard to the risk, the missing persons’ right to privacy and the impact the inclusion may have on the missing person.
3.24 At immediate risk of serious harm and not locatable or contactable by any less intrusive means.
3.25 Intelligence suggests the person poses an immediate risk of serious harm to another person.
3.26 For a person to be included on the watchlist the Police must have a legal basis for action under a policing common law power.
3.27 The risk of harm will be informed by the intelligence case and/or the considerations set out in the applicable LFR form. This will need to inform the AO as to how the individual present a risk of harm or why they are likely to suffer harm and:
3.28 The applicant would also have to demonstrate the proportionality of any inclusion on a Watchlist. This would include considering:
3.29 Where it is viable to do so without unduly impacting on the performance of the LFR System, suitable police-originated images should be preferred for inclusion on a Watchlist. However, there will be occasions, where no image is held by EP or the wider law enforcement community, or if one is held, its quality or currency is not optimal for facial recognition purposes. In these circumstances, consideration may be given to the inclusion of a non-police originated image.
3.30 Non-police originated images are images which have not been taken by law enforcement. The expectations of privacy, and the intrusion associated with such images can vary depending on the nature of the image and to aid decision making and foreseeability, these have been attributed to three ‘layers of intrusiveness.
Assessing Non-police originated sources of Watchlist imagery
Non-police originated images where it is assessed that the public would expect the law enforcement to have access to them (but not including images obtained by covert means) with examples of criteria including:
Images where it is assessed that they raise elevated expectations of privacy or where otherwise obtained covertly without the knowledge of the subject, including any imagery obtained pursuant to:
Where the ability of relevant bodies to obtain such images is further supported and can be anticipated by reference to published Codes of Practice.
Non-police originated images in circumstances where it is assessed that the public would not typically expect their image to be shared to, or accessed by the police at the point they provided it but there is nevertheless a lawful basis for the police to hold the imagery it has received.
To help the public foresee where this may arise, this could include circumstances where the public have shared their image with a controller of data for an explicit purpose (be with a person, business, public body or other third party) and it was not in their contemplation at the time of sharing their image that it may be used for a law enforcement purpose. This would be particularly relevant where the controller promotes an approach to privacy which does not typically collaborate with UK law enforcement.
3.31 Any non-police originated image should only be included in a Watchlist with the authorisation of the AO where the necessity case to do so is made out. The AO should also consider all the circumstances pertaining to the image and in particular which layer of intrusiveness the image is attributable to and the factors.
3.32 The types of non-police originated images that may be deemed appropriate for inclusion within an LFR watchlist are of people:
a) wanted by the courts; and/or
b) suspected of having committed, or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual depicted is about to commit an offence or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect an individual depicted to be
committing an offence; and/or
c) subject to bail conditions, court order or other restrictions that would be breached if they were at the location at the time of the Deployment; and/or) missing persons deemed increased risk; and/or
d) presenting a risk of harm to themselves or others; and/or
e) who are a victim of an offence, a person who the police have reasonable grounds to suspect that person would have information of importance and relevance to progress an investigation, or is otherwise a close associate of an individual and that individual themselves would fall within paragraphs (a) – (d).
For each authorised LFR operation, the following assessments need to be created, reviewed, and amended where necessary: -
Note: *Any assessment listed above showing `Review/Amend/Adopt’ has already been created by the EP LFR team. Each will require a case-by-case consideration to ensure the document remains appropriate and sufficient for each LFR operation.
3.34.1 Each Deployment should be risk assessed in line with EP procedure. The anticipated risk to officers and the public should be balanced against the overall intelligence picture, relevant factors linked to persons included on the Watchlist (e.g. seriousness of offences and warning markers linked to the use of violence, carriage of weapons, and propensity to escape, etc), the physical environment surrounding the Deployment, timing, community tension, and any other factors that appear relevant.
3.34.2 The level of resources, including back-up contingencies, required to support each Deployment is a matter to be determined by the operation’s command team.
3.34.3 Given the level of intrusion linked to the use of LFR for members of the public passing through the Zone of Recognition, and the processing of biometric data, it is vital that the command team ensure that sufficient resources are available to respond effectively to Alerts and to meet the law enforcement purpose of the LFR Deployment.
3.34.4 LFR System Engineers will be deployed to support LFR Deployments where required.
3.34.5 All EP officers and staff deployed on LFR Deployments must be compliant and in date with EP First Aid and where applicable officer safety (OST) training requirements. All EP officers and staff involved in an LFR Deployment must receive LFR training prior to being deployed.
3.34.6 As part of the application process, the applicant should consult with the Operational Policing Command LFR team and or Covert Authority Bureau (CAB) to determine the appropriateness and viability of a deployment.
This should be done before the application is submitted to the AO.
3.35.1 Cameras must be selected so that the image resolution, framerate, field-of-view and low-level light performance can provide images of sufficient quality for use in the facial recognition application. Current FR systems typically require a facial image with between 20 and 100 pixels between the centres of the subject’s eyes (Inter-Eye Distance or IED). The FR vendor should advise on specific requirements for their system.
3.35.2 Unless the environment is well controlled, cameras must be capable of operating at Wide Dynamic Range in order to generate high quality images under a variety of lighting conditions.
3.35.3 Cameras should ideally be positioned to capture faces as close as possible to the ‘face-on’ condition, similar to a passport image. This typically requires the cameras to be much lower than is normally the case for existing CCTV. Camera placement and angle should be further considered where those sought may be more likely to be occluded in a busy crowd in order to maximise the prospects of location.
3.35.4 Ideally the environment should be managed such that every face is evenly illuminated. Highly directional lighting, for example strong sunlight, should be avoided, which may require consideration of how the lighting will change throughout the day.
3.35.5 In general, the Zone of Recognition will be smaller than the field of view of the camera; for example, not all faces in the field of view may be in focus and not every face in the field of view will be imaged with the minimum necessary Inter-Eye Distance (IED).
3.35.6 A typical 2MP camera will provide sufficient resolution for LFR to work on a maximum of 3 to 4 people side by side. Therefore, consideration needs to be given to camera location and the physical environment. For example, looking for opportunities to funnel or restrict the movement of people within the Zone of Recognition.
However, if the flow is reduced beyond a certain level, individuals may be grouped very close together, occluding or partly occluding the faces of people (people behind people).
3.35.7 Detection and processing of faces is an intensive task for a computer system.
The supplier of LFR software should provide guidance on hardware requirements and the number of faces that can be simultaneously processed from within a single frame.
If the system is set to process too many faces, this will potentially result in delays to the LFR system response. It may also result in missed Alerts due to ‘dropped frames’ where the software skips some of the video footage in an attempt to catch up.
LFR Command Team
3.36.1 LFR Deployments must be supported with a clear command structure. The following roles are defined for the purpose of creating an appropriate hierarchical command structure: -
3.36.2 Where LFR Deployments form part of a larger overarching policing operation, the terms Gold, Silver and Bronze (as described above) may be substituted for alternative command team terminology or be subsumed into a larger command structure as necessary and appropriate for the effective delivery of the overarching policing operation.
3.37.1 LFR Operators receive detailed training prior to being deployed operationally.
Their role is to monitor and assess application Alerts, before working with LFR Engagement Officers (as necessary) to decide whether an Engagement is required.
3.37.2 The LFR Operator must log all Alerts to help facilitate and support command team reviews during the Deployment, and those that take place post-Deployment. The LFR Operator must flag any concerns they have regarding LFR System performance to the Silver Commander.
3.37.3 The LFR Operator’s log should include: -
3.38.1 LFR Engagement Officers must have an understanding of the LFR application, how it performs, and what effect Subject, System, and Environmental Factors might have. These officers must receive a full operational briefing prior to deployment.
These officers will be deployed in uniform.
3.38.2 When conducting an Engagement, LFR Engagement Officers must ensure that they do so lawfully, and in an appropriate and proportionate manner. Officers must comply with the Code of Ethics at all times. Wherever possible, members of the public who have been subject of an Engagement, should be supplied with an LFR information leaflet.
3.38.3 The LFR Operator may be supportive of an engagement taking place, but in any case, it is always for an LFR Engagement Officer to make their own final decision on whether an Engagement should take place11. It must not be an automatic consequence that an Alert results in an Engagement. In making their decisions, LFR Engagement Officers must give due regard to the likelihood of Subject, System, or Environmental Factors influencing the generation of an Alert.
3.38.4 When an Engagement is initiated, it is for the officers involved to investigate the identity of the person Engaged using appropriate and lawful means at their disposal
3.38.5 Whilst officers must exercise their own discretion when using their powers of arrest and detention, EP policy is that an LFR application-generated Alert on its own, indicating that a person is wanted, should not ordinarily be taken as providing sufficient grounds for arrest or detention. Officers should always seek to make sufficient additional enquiries to satisfy themselves of their grounds to arrest or detain.
Where confronted with a non-compliant subject, and the circumstances are such that an officer has an honestly held belief they must use their powers of arrest/detention before further checks have been possible, and this results in the use of those powers, then further checks (as necessary) should be made as soon as is reasonably practicable, so that the decision to arrest/detain is reviewed without unnecessary delay.
3.38.6 If an Engaged individual cannot be identified or fails to confirm their identity, this alone does not constitute a criminal offence and does not necessarily render them liable to arrest. Officers must be in a position to justify the use of any powers, any action taken, and have a lawful basis for doing so.
3.38.7 After any Engagement (that follows an Alert), the LFR Engagement Officer must update the LFR Operator with the outcome of that Engagement.
3.38.8 Where members of the public choose to exercise their right to avoid an LFR Zone of Recognition, officers are reminded that this is not an offence. The police have no legal powers to direct or compel members of the public to enter a Zone of Recognition. None of this means that LFR Engagement Officers, or other officers
involved in an ancillary role linked to an LFR Deployment, cannot or should not engage with a member of the public as they would do in any other set of circumstances where someone’s behaviour or presence gives rise to suspicion or the use of any other policing power where it is right and proper to do so.
3.39.1 LFR System Engineers have enhanced technical training for the Deployment of LFR (see EP LFR Policy Document for further information). LFR System Engineers are responsible for the set-up of the LFR equipment and the optimisation of the LFR application to maximise performance.
3.40.1 Public engagement must be supported using online resources available to the public, which should be underpinned by a press and media strategy giving advance notice of deployments. At and around the location of deployments, notices providing information, including details of the Privacy Notice, should be distributed and feedback via email should be sought.
3.40.2 Operational briefings delivered to officers and stakeholders prior to deployments should promote openness with the public and transparency about the use of LFR.
Officers should be encouraged to engage with the public to increase awareness of how LFR helps keep the public safe and how it helps bring offenders to justice. It is also helpful for officers to be in possession of information leaflets that can be handed out to the public. Such information leaflets should deliver important key messages aimed at promoting trust and confidence through improved understanding.
3.40.3 Key stakeholders, including the PCC’s Office, may be invited to observe the planning and deployment of LFR although it must be noted that the deployment is an operational matter.
3.40.4 In advance of deployments EP will ensure that:
a) LFR Deployments are notified to the public using EP website and other appropriate communication channels (including social media); and
b) LFR awareness raising measures (e.g. signs and/or leaflets) are prepared to support LFR deployment in line with EP LFR SOP; and
c) literature is prepared for persons who may be engaged (to include information outlined within a privacy notice); and
d) Officers are briefed on their powers and the limits thereof. In particular, it must be made clear that there is no power to require an individual’s cooperation in having their image captured, unless either the threshold for arrest has been reached, or an Inspector or above has authorised the exercise of the power under section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 for a Constable in uniform to compel a person to remove anything that conceals their identity; and
e) External engagement is considered in discussion with EP LFR team. It may be appropriate to pursue engagement opportunities with several stakeholders, including local authorities, and public consultative or ethical review bodies. It is important that engagement is coordinated and so the LFR team must be consulted prior to this kind of activity.
3.40.5 During deployments EP will ensure that:
a) awareness raising measures are used in line with the EP LFR SOP to ensure that the policing presence is overt such that the public can establish that LFR is being used and understand the nature of the data being processed; and
b) notices with a brief explanation and reference to EP website are available to hand out to the public on request; and
c) information is offered to persons engaged by officers in accordance with the policy referred to above.
3.40.6 After deployments EP ensure that:
a) information about the deployment, including location, time, date, number of alerts, engagements, arrests, and any other information considered helpful and suitable for disclosure, is published on EP website. Care must be taken to ensure that no personal data is published;
b) external engagement is considered in discussion with EP LFR team. Again, it may be appropriate to pursue engagement opportunities with several stakeholders, including local authorities, and public consultative or ethical
review bodies. It is important that engagement is coordinated and so the LFR team must be consulted prior to this kind of activity; and
c) engagement with representatives from the Information Commissioners Office will be ongoing.
3.40.7 Post-Deployment
a) Following each LFR Deployment, the Silver Commander must ensure that a post Deployment evaluation is completed which is updated in the Deployment Record. The evaluation process must capture an assessment of the operational effectiveness of the LFR Deployment. This evaluation should be both qualitative and quantitative in nature.
b) The evaluation should clearly articulate what measures are used to assess effectiveness and what benchmarking criteria are used. It should also assess the effectiveness of the safeguards used for the Deployment and what opportunities exist to improve them for future use, and how learning will be
shared.
The evaluation may include as many measures as appear appropriate, but as a minimum must include the following metrics (including what methods were used to obtain them): -
3.41.1 The LFR application includes a number of physical and technical security measures. These include: -
3.41.2 The LFR application is a fully closed system with two layers of password protection to access the application; and
3.41.3 The LFR application is physically protected when in use and deployment data stored on the system is securely wiped following each Deployment; and
3.41.4 Role based access controls with limited user permissions are implemented on the LFR application; and
3.41.5 The LFR application can be connected to mobile devices using a private access point with three levels of protection: Specific IP addressing,
3.41.6 Password access to the access point, and password access to the mobile App.
3.41.7 The Dashboard and RESTful API are secured with SSL and TLS by default; and all connections are directed through HTTPS; and
3.41.8 A full audit is maintained of all users initiated actions undertaken during the course of a Deployment; and
3.41.9 technical issues with the LFR application are always dealt with by LFR System Engineers deployed on the operation.
3.42.1 EP must ensure that the processing of any data associated with LFR is conducted in a lawful way and in compliance with the EP LFR Documents. This means that: -
3.42.2 Where the LFR application generates an Alert, all personal data is deleted as soon as practicable and in any case within 24 hours.
3.42.3 All CCTV footage generated from LFR Deployments is deleted within 31 days, except where retained: -
3.42.4 To support compliance the LFR application has a full audit capability, and the LFR Operator and LFR Engagement Officer log is retained in line with MOPI retention periods.
3.42.5 The loss or theft of any LFR hardware (laptop, mobile device, camera etc.) or other data, irrespective of whether protected by encryption, must be reported immediately to the AO, Gold, and the EP Data Protection Officer.
3.43.1 Any Deployment of LFR must be recorded on a centrally held register. This register will record a number of things including: -
3.43.2 EP will make information relating to LFR Deployments available to the public in accordance with the EP LFR Documents.
3.44.1 The Essex Police LFR team can be contacted on [email protected]
3.45.1The following stipulations are accepted by Essex Police:
3.45.2 Governance and oversight of the use of the technology is approached in the three stages below:
3.45.3 Pre-deployment:
These are set out below:
Essex Police LFR Deployment Specific Documents and Records
LFR Application
Sets out the details of a proposed deployment including location, dates/times, legitimate aim, legal basis, necessity, proportionality, safeguards, Watchlist composition, and resources.
Written Authority Document
The AO’s written authority provides a decision-making audit trail demonstrating how the AO has considered the legality, necessity and proportionality of the deployment of LFR, the safeguards that apply and the alternatives that were considered but deemed to be less viable to realise the policing purpose.
The written authority also details the arrangements that have been made to manage the retention and/or disposal of any personal data obtained because of the LFR Deployment.
The written approval must be retained in accordance with MOPI and other relevant legislation or policy and be made available for independent inspection and review as required.
LFR Deployment Record
Records details of where and when a deployment was carried out, what resources were used, relevant statistics, outcomes and summary of any issues.
Assessments
These include the Community Impact Assessment, the Equality Impact Assessment, the Data Protection Impact Assessment, and the Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Self-Assessment.
These documents need to be considered by the decision-maker when authoring a deployment to ensure they are sufficient to address the issues arising from the proposed deployment.
The decision-maker must ensure that issues have been adequately identified, documented, and mitigated by way of safeguards such that the deployment is not only necessary, but also proportionate to the policing purpose.
Deployment Logs
Logs completed in the planning and execution of an LFR deployment. For example, logs completed by the Gold and Silver Commanders, LFR Operators and LFR Engagement Officers.
3.46 Several other specific Essex Police documents pertaining to each Essex Police
LFR deployment have been completed centrally. These are set out below:
Essex Police Data Processing – Appropriate Policy Documents
Essex Police policy on the processing of data pursuant to the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK General Data Protection Regulation relating to LFR.
Essex Police Legal Mandate
Outlines the legal considerations to be addressed to use LFR.
Essex Police
Provides the necessary training to ensure those involved in authorising and deploying LFR are familiar and implement the considerations relevant to its lawful, ethical and appropriate use.
3.47.1 Within EP, the senior internal oversight body for LFR is the FR Governance Board. In addition, The EP PFCCs office also provide an external oversight and scrutiny perspective.
3.47.2 EP LFR legal mandate sets out the legal framework for EP use of LFR technology, whilst EP LFR Policy Document and this EP LFR procedure document support implementation.
3.47.3 Nationally, the `NPCC Facial Recognition Technology Board’ provides oversight for the operational uses of facial recognition within UK Law Enforcement.
3.47.4 Further oversight opportunities may arise in relation to the `Joint National Biometric Strategic Board’. This is co-chaired by the NPCC and the Home Office Data and Identity Department, and involves representatives of the Information Commissioners Office, the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, and the Biometric Commissioner. More detail on these roles:
EIA – Sept 2024.
5.1 Each Deployment should be risk assessed in line with EP procedure. The anticipated risk to officers and the public should be balanced against the overall intelligence picture, relevant factors linked to persons included on the Watchlist (e.g. seriousness of offences and warning markers linked to the use of violence, carriage of weapons, and propensity to escape, etc), the physical environment surrounding the Deployment, timing, community tension, and any other factors that appear relevant.
5.2 The level of resources, including back-up contingencies, required to support each Deployment is a matter to be determined by the operation’s command team.
5.3 Given the level of intrusion linked to the use of LFR for members of the public passing through the Zone of Recognition, and the processing of biometric data, it is vital that the command team ensure that sufficient resources are available to respond effectively to Alerts and to meet the law enforcement purpose of the LFR Deployment.
5.4 LFR System Engineers will be deployed to support LFR Deployments where required.
5.5 All EP officers and staff deployed on LFR Deployments must be compliant and in date with EP First Aid and where applicable officer safety (OST) training requirements. All EP officers and staff involved in an LFR Deployment must receive LFR training prior to being deployed.
The following have been consulted during the formulation of this document:
The author will carry out intermittent reviews for legislation, any process changes and will carry out yearly reviews of the whole document.
Related Force policies or related procedures
Essex Police have measures in place to protect the security of your data in accordance with our Information Management Policy – W 1000 Policy – Information Management.
Essex Police will hold data in accordance with our Records Review, Retention & Disposal Policy – W 1012 Procedure/SOP - Records Review, Retention and Disposal.
We will only hold data for as long as necessary for the purposes for which we collected. Victims/public should be reminded that Essex Police take the protection of personal data seriously as described in the privacy notice.
9.1 Further documentation is available providing useful information relevant to LFR.
This is detailed below.